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ABSTRACT
When are emigrants really enfranchised? Lengthy lags exist between some reforms
that de jure introduced external voting and their application. In the blooming
literature on emigrant enfranchisement, these lags remain unexplained. We argue
that this hampers our understanding of enfranchisement processes as having
diﬀerent legal and political stages. With data on Latin American and Caribbean
states since 1965 until the present, we investigate why some states in this region
have delayed the regulation and application of external franchise while others have
implemented it right after enactment. We propose hypotheses to understand these
reforms as episodes marked by diﬀerent contexts, engineered by diﬀerent agent
coalitions and embedded into larger processes of political change. In particular, we
suggest that enfranchisement processes are composed of three stages: enactment,
regulation, and ﬁrst application. Our ﬁndings suggest that the process of adoption
of external voting is shaped by the legal mechanism of enactment and the stability
of political coalitions.
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Introduction
As Caramani and Grotz put it boldly in their introduction of the special issue “Voting
rights in the age of globalization” published in 2015 in this very journal, “modern
democracy is unthinkable without universal suﬀrage”.1 Although there is a consensus
regarding the essential role of universal suﬀrage for democracies, the convention of
what “universal suﬀrage” entails is still very much evolving.2 After the extension of
suﬀrage to women, ethnic and religious minorities and all economic and educational
groups, restrictions remain based on age, sanity, law-abidingness, citizenship and resi-
dence.3 With the intensiﬁcation of globalization, the restrictions based on residence are
increasingly contested4 and more and more countries have enfranchised non-citizen
residents to the point that, according to some, we might be witnessing a new convention
of what we understand as “universal suﬀrage”.5
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Extensions of suﬀrage only become true when the jure changes in electoral regu-
lations are applied in actual elections. But this does not always follow. For example,
in 2012, Nicaraguan citizens living abroad were granted the right to vote in home elec-
tions, which is signiﬁcant for a country whose share of the population living abroad sur-
passes 12% and contributes substantially to its capital inﬂows. However, six years later,
Nicaraguans abroad have not been able to exercise that right; it is not even clear under
what conditions their votes would be cast and counted. Can we say that Nicaraguans
abroad are enfranchised? Case researchers will say that Nicaragua seems temporarily
stuck in its enfranchisement process. For comparative researchers, however, the
answer is central to counting Nicaragua within a trend of cases that have enfranchised
emigrants or among those that have not. Striking a balance between case and compara-
tive research, the issue about determining the completeness of this policy outcome6 is
about much more than properly coding a yes or no. This is a substantial issue for
enfranchisement studies at large because the length and number of steps involved
from the enacting to applying enfranchisement (to emigrants as well to other disenfran-
chised groups) introduces additional room for tinkering with a reform and changing its
scope by way of secondary regulation or even by multiple rounds of re-regulation, as
Turcu7 has recently shown.
In some protracted enfranchisement processes the lags are so salient that some scho-
lars have even suggested that political intention is to blame8 but this has not been
veriﬁed comparatively. It is clear that a truncated enfranchisement is not really compar-
able to a fully implemented one; the former suggests a cheap move to grant rights only
to stop short of applying them. Yet, the fuzziness in the literature about this has led to
datasets with diﬀerent time references to mark the same enfranchisement and to test
hypotheses (not unlike the discussion on measures of democracy by Beckman 2008).
Experts on periodization remind us that while some episodes of interest seem con-
tained in their occurrence and lend themselves to straightforward examination and com-
parison, others have debatable boundaries9 – this applies in fact to a larger policy
literature.10 As Tilly11 once said, “analysts chop continuous streams of social life into epi-
sodes according to conventions of their own making”. Thus, we need to be clear about
what we make into an event. We propose that if we diﬀerentiate the key stages involved
in external enfranchisement processes, we will be able to compare them on a common
ground; we will be able to see a substantial diﬀerence between a fully-ﬂedged extension
of a right to exercise citizenship and a policy with no eﬀects and no practicability.
More than solving fuzziness in comparative research, the bigger promise is to prevent
mistaking a process with duration for a punctual event.12 As a well-known expert of per-
iodization warned, “events with duration must be carefully conceptualized and the
meaning of their duration understood”.13 We want to propose to the literature that
enfranchisements are processes with various durations and paths.
Certainly, studies on other kinds of enfranchisement have provided pioneering
insights to upgrade enfranchisement to a proper process (in Tilly’s language) and to
understand that franchise adoption is not necessarily a single, discrete outcome, but
one that involves sequences. In particular, research on women’s suﬀrage,14 the
enfranchisement of non-citizen immigrant residents,15 and of prisoners16 have disag-
gregated the legislative processes into stages showing enfranchisement in terms of
levels of policy success. They all show that enfranchisement processes have their own
institutional logic, where each step carries diﬀerent kinds of consequences for legis-
lators. What we propose here is to extend these works by exploring policymaking
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mechanisms beyond the standard legislative procedure and by comparing enfranchise-
ment processes in which the potentially included electorate is absent from the territory
and, due to that, has limited means at their disposal to push the process forward.
Thus, rather than asking why states enfranchise their citizens abroad (which has
gathered substantial attention in this journal), our related, but diﬀerent research ques-
tion is : How come some processes reach a generous enfranchisement reform at once,
while others get stuck after initial steps? To answer it we look at processes of enfranch-
isement of emigrants across Latin America and Caribbean states. We select this region
because it has pioneered emigrant enfranchisement, having rich variation of external
franchise models and regarding the swiftness of their implementation, from immediate
(for example, El Salvador) to a 15-year lag (for example, Brazil).
This article proceeds as follows: First, we conceptualize enfranchisement as a process
with three stages. Next, with data collected as part of the Polities Beyond Borders project
(GIGA) we explore whether a lag between stages is random or whether it follows a
pattern. Then, we develop exploratory hypotheses that propose diﬀerent kinds of relation-
ships between the regulatory mechanism and the lag. Finally, we explore these hypotheses
with ﬁve case studies (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru).
Three stages of non-resident enfranchisement
The conceptualization of external enfranchisement as a one-time event is common in the
literature on external voting, just as in the enfranchisement literature more generally.17
Scholars usually signal only one point in time to refer to external voting rights approval,
and then move on to analyse the reasons for adoption –such as the country’s dependence
on the remittances sent by emigrants,18 the pressure exercised by new international
norms,19 as a mode of reparation to exiles,20 or a transition to democracy.21 In the
ﬁeld of Political Theory scholars proceed similarly: when they weigh the normative con-
cerns of extending the franchise to emigrants (for instance, their lack of information
about home politics, their potential lack of stakes in homeland issues, the unpredictability
of their voting patterns, or the diﬃculty to assure the quality of elections abroad) they
consider enfranchisement a one-time, discrete phenomenon.22
Nevertheless, some scholars have noted that emigrant enfranchisement is not necess-
arily a one point event. For instance, in their pioneering comparative study of external
voting, Nohlen and Grotz already argued that “the introduction of external voting was
often not a single act of decision and implementation, but a process lasting for years or
even decades”.23 Calderón also diﬀerentiated between the approval of external voting
rights in Latin America and the “actual state” of legislation, leaving room to specify
if further legislation was needed, or if only the application was pending.24 In that
year, out of 11 countries which she registered as having approved external franchise,
6 were stuck before implementation. Escobar 25 studied variations in timing, sequence,
and form in which major Latin American countries allowed dual citizenship and
extended political rights to their nationals abroad. In a study of selected cases, she sim-
pliﬁed the problem by distinguishing between formal legislation and ﬁrst electoral par-
ticipation. However, her two-stage distinction still hid the character of the formal
legislation it was a result of. Although she did refer to diﬀerent causes for a gap in
her case studies, she did not problematize that gap in her comparisons. Analyzing
the restrictions to enfranchisement in 7 Latin American countries, Laﬂeur overcame
the riddle by registering the year of ﬁrst democratic external voting experience.26 For
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other regions, a solution has been to distinguish the legal basis for external voting from
its implementation.27
Instead of doing away with the issue, we seek to understand why it exists. It is not
only the mere duration of enfranchisement that matters, but also, as Abbott would
put it, it is “the quality of those temporal extensions that diﬀers substantively”.28 We
propose that the adoption of external electoral rights is a process composed of three
main stages (see Table 1). The ﬁrst (t1) is the "enactment" of the electoral rights,
which usually requires an amendment of the electoral law or/and of the Constitution.
Enactment requires that political elites agree on the importance (and perhaps more
accurately, the convenience) of enfranchising non-residents abroad and, understand-
ably, this is the stage that most of the external enfranchisement studies focus on:29 it
is when legislators debate arguments for and against and decide and determine the
scope and level (active/passive; national level presidential and/or legislative, subnational
levels, etc.) of external voting rights.
The second necessary stage for the adoption of external electoral rights is “regu-
lation” (t2), which includes all the secondary law-making needed in order to hold elec-
tions outside the territorial boundaries of the states of origin. It deﬁnes the contours of
the external electoral system abroad and, therefore, the restrictiveness of external elec-
toral rights on matters such as the inclusion of non-residents in the electoral register,
voting methods, modes of representation, provisions for polling stations and even
the rules for political competition abroad. This stage still allows legislators to signiﬁ-
cantly restrict the number of non-residents eligible to participate in elections.30 An
example is the Bolivian government 2009s restriction of external voting to only four
cities in the world.31
However, it is only the third stage, the ﬁnal adoption of external franchise (t3), which
marks readiness for implementation when the corresponding electoral authority aligns
the organization of elections to the new regulations and calls emigrants to cast a ballot
from abroad for home elections.
If these stages exist, we might need to understand that the adoption of the external
franchise as a dynamic process. To explore this we will turn now to compare processes
of external franchise adoption in the LAC region.
Three stages of external enfranchisement in Latin America and the Caribbean
Table 2 shows the adoption of active electoral rights in LAC countries. A total of 15 LAC
states have extended active electoral rights to non-resident citizens for at least one type
of elections. Ecuador and Colombia allow their emigrants to vote in all home elections,
while other states only allow emigrants to vote for presidential elections (for example,
Table 1. The three stages of external enfranchisement.
Stages Enactment (t1) Regulation (t2) Application (t3)
Decisions Scope of external enfranchisement:
. Active or passive electoral rights
. Type of election (presidential,
legislative, referendum)











. Postal voting organisation
. Civic education and
participation campaigns
Note: Own elaboration.
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Bolivia or Paraguay). Furthermore, there are signiﬁcant variations in the year of enact-
ment of external active electoral rights. Colombia and Brazil stand out as the two
countries in the region that ﬁrst enacted laws aimed at incorporating emigrants into
the electorate (1961 and 1965 respectively). Other countries have only recently taken
the ﬁrst steps towards external franchise, with Chile being the latest.
With two diﬀerent measures we want to highlight the lag between enactment and the
second and third stages of the adoption. The ﬁrst is the number of years lapsed between
the three stages of t1, t2, and t3. The second is the number of elections held between t1,
t2, and t3. Both show important variations across countries. On the one hand, Argen-
tina, El Salvador or Paraguay did not show any lag -neither measured in years since
enactment nor in elections held since enactment). On the other hand, some countries
have lagged in the regulation of external electoral rights, letting more than 20 years and
4-5 electoral cycles pass before ﬁrst application, such as Brazil or Honduras. In the
general trend, there is no a signiﬁcant lag between regulation and the ﬁrst application
–t2 and t3- of electoral rights. Exceptions are Brazil and Costa Rica, where external elec-
toral rights were applied four years (one election) after regulation.
Understanding external enfranchisement processes: exploratory
hypotheses
If franchise extensions were embedded in larger processes of political change, their
being whole or truncated could reveal something about those processes. With regard
to democratization processes, we hypothesize that the countries that introduced
Table 2. Adoption of external active electoral rights in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Country Type of election
Year of No of elections until
Enactment Regulation Application Regulation Application
Argentina Presidential 1991 1993 1995 0 0
Lower H. 1991 1993 1993 0 0
Upper H. 1991 1993 1993 0 0
Bolivia Presidential 1991 2009 2009 4 4
Brazil Presidential 1965 1985 1989 4 5
Chile Presidential 2014 2016 2017 0 0
Colombia Presidential 1961 1962 1962 0 0
Lower H. 1991 2001 2002 2 3
Upper H. 1991 1997 1997 1 1
Costa Rica Presidential 2006 2009 2014 1 2
Dom. Republic Presidential 1997 2004 2004 1 1
Lower H. 2010 2010 2012 0 0
Ecuador Presidential 1998 2006 2006 1 1
Lower H. 2006 2006 2007 0 0
El Salvador Presidential 2013 2014 2015 0 0
Honduras Presidential 1981 2001 2001 4 4
Mexico Presidential 1996 2005 2006 2 3
Upper H. 2014 2014 Not applied 0 –
Nicaragua Presidential 2012 Not regulated Not applied – –
Lower H. 2012 Not regulated Not applied – –
Paraguay Presidential 2011 2013 2013 0 0
Peru Presidential 1980 1979 1980 0 0
Lower H. 1992 1992 1992 0 0
Upper H. 1980 1979 1980 0 0
Venezuela Presidential 1993 1998 1998 0 0
Note: Own elaboration based on **EMIX Emigrant Policies Index; **Lower H. = Lower House; Upper H. = Upper
House.
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external franchise after becoming full democracies will have longer external enfranch-
isement processes (H1). This is because in contexts of democratization, where political
controls are still under negotiation, enfranchisements may be part of particular political
compromises that involve some laxity about speciﬁc details which in times of regime
stability may generate lengthier debates.32
A factor we ﬁnd plausible to explain more particularly the varying length of emigrant
enfranchisement processes is the legal mechanism to enact it (H2).33 We see three main
variants of such hypothesis (Table 3). The ﬁrst is that the enactment occurs after a man-
datory referendum in which citizens decide whether or not to support the extension of
franchise to non-residents. Following literature on policy-making via referendum, we
expect that under this scenario governments and legislatures have a popular mandate
that may translate into a swifter adoption of this particular policy since it enables the
bypass of legislative opposition.34 We propose that the adoption process of external
voting will be expedited if it is the result of a conﬁrmatory and binding referendum
(H2a).35 The second variant is that external electoral rights are part of a newly
enacted constitution, as it usually occurs in (re-)foundational moments in a democra-
tization scenario.36 We expect that such scenario poses a less direct mandate, as external
voting regulation falls both below the level of attention of other issues that are likely to
have priority for political and civil society actors (for example, the rules and organiz-
ation of elections for the domestic electorate) and below the level of abstraction that
deﬁnes primary norms of constitution-making.37 Thus, we expect that this legal mech-
anism will lead to lagged enfranchisement processes (H2b). Finally, the third variant
refers to an ordinary constitutional amendment or a new electoral law carried out by
the legislative power. As economists and legal theorists note, sequential law-making
is prone to lags, especially when a delay promises more rewards than swift com-
pletion.38 Subordinated to this hypothesis -and connecting our argument to the argu-
ments made to explain the very adoption of external voting-,39 we propose that the
length of the enfranchisement process via ordinary law-making will depend on the
expectations that political groups represented in the legislature at the moment of enact-
ment have regarding the political beneﬁts (and costs) of extending the suﬀrage to emi-
grants. Political groups that expect to increase their total share of votes will be more
prone to expedite the adoption process, and vice versa. For this reason, we propose
that a greater legislative consensus regarding external voting will translate into a
swifter adoption process, since the power of opposition groups to hinder it is
reduced (H2c). To explore this we will consider the political contestation and the stab-
ility of political coalitions across legislative periods.
Table 3. Hypotheses.
Hypothesis Lag in the external adoption process?





New Constitution (H2b) Yes
Legislative change (with fragmented legislative) (H2c) Yes
Legislative change (without fragmented legislative) (H2c) No
Note: Own elaboration
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Case selection
In order to try our hypotheses in cases of various outcomes (our dependent variable is
enfranchisement as a process that may lag) and with maximum variation regarding the
main variables considered we have opted for a “diverse cases” selection strategy.40 We
introduce variation into the enfranchisement process outcomes by studying two
countries with a lag between enactment, regulation and ﬁrst implementation (Mexico
and Bolivia) and three countries without a lag (Argentina, Paraguay and Peru). We
include in our sample cases that adopted non-resident franchise in a context of demo-
cratic freedoms and institutions (Paraguay and Bolivia) and others that did so during a
process of democratization (Argentina, Mexico and Peru). Furthermore, we study two
countries that extended electoral rights to non-residents via ordinary law-making
(Mexico and Argentina), two countries that did it through a new constitution
(Bolivia and Peru) and the only country in our sample that introduced external
voting after a referendum (Paraguay). Finally, the cases selected also present variation
regarding their dependence on remittances (Peru and Bolivia with a high dependency;
Argentina, Paraguay andMexico with low dependency), the moment of the extension of
suﬀrage (Peru being an early adopter in the region and Paraguay and Bolivia as recent
cases) and the level of concentration of the diaspora abroad (Mexico being a case of high
concentration and the others having a more disperse diaspora) (Table 4).
Case analyses
Argentina: a change in the electoral law that leads to a fast adoption process
Argentina allows its emigrants to vote actively in executive and legislative national elec-
tions, but does not allow voting in subnational elections despite being a federal state. To
vote, Argentines abroad must go in-person to booths in any of the 155 consulates in 87
countries after registering at least six months before the election (data from 2015). This
is automatically renewed for every election thereafter. The Argentine parliament has
four-year long periods, renews its half every two years and has sessions from March
until November.
Argentines abroad were enfranchised in November 1991 by Law 24,007 (Figure 1)
through an ordinary legislative process. There was no lag in the adoption process, as
the two necessary steps were swiftly accomplished within two years between approval
Table 4. LAC countries with external enfranchisement by policymaking route for
enactment and presence of a lag.









Note: Own elaboration. Nicaragua is not included in the case selection because,
by the time of writing, they have not yet concluded their process of adoption.
Countries that enacted external voting in a context of democratization are
written in italics.
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and ﬁrst application. The enactment in 1991 had been possible after just two attempts in
1986 and 1988, at which the proposals stranded in limbo. The process before enactment
(t1) saw through six legislatures, including a period of extreme economic distress and an
episode of democratization with factionalisms from 1983 to 1989.41 In comparison to
the length of t1, the necessary steps for the regulation (for instance to create a new elec-
toral registry for residents abroad) were taken swiftly through two legislatures: the
Decree 1138 of June 1993 passed in a legislature with nearly the same composition
as the previous one. This Decree allowed external voting to be applied in October the
same year, to renew half of the legislature.
The legislative proposal entered the Senate in July 1991 after being presented by the
executive, President Menem, from the Partido Justicialista (PJ). In this legislative
period, the Argentinian Lower House was characterized by a low fragmentation and
a low eﬀective number of parties (two parties, the Partido Justicialista and the Unión
Cívica Radical accounted for 83% of the total seats). Also under the presidency of
Menem, the regulating Decree was approved by the next legislature, in which the
balance of seats remained almost the same. The enfranchisement of Argentines
abroad was an issue that enjoyed ample political support: previous proposals had
been made by the UCD representatives and had gathered consensual support in the
Senate, yet stranded in a legislative limbo merely due to the much more pressing and
divisive issues in a country submerged not only in a ﬁerce and recurrent economic
crisis but also in a political transition from the military dictatorship. According to
some researchers,42 the democratization context explains the broad agreement on
this extension of rights, as it resonated with the promotion and restoration of human
and civil rights. It was also a symbolic means of making amends to Argentines in
exile. Moreover, in a context of democratization through electoral means, extensions
of electoral rights served as a source of legitimacy for the new regime.
The low proportion of Argentines abroad in the voting population could have made
this a negligible (non-controversial) issue, but the exact number of emigrants has been
diﬃcult to calculate, oscillating between one and three million, with a high percentage
of highly qualiﬁed emigrants.43 In the 1990s, economic crises sparked emigration from
middle classes with middle and higher education proﬁles, but the overall proﬁle of the
Figure 1. Argentina’s external voting adoption process.
Note: Own elaboration. Left axis represents remittances (World Bank, Personal Remittances received as a percentage of GDP).
Right axis represents Polity IV indicator.
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diaspora is quite diverse.44,45 As a result of this proﬁle, remittances have not been key to
the Argentine economy, averaging only 30.6 US million in the ﬁve years between 1982
and 1987 (equivalent to less than 0.08% of the GDP),46 the period in which electoral
rights for emigrants began to be discussed. Diaspora mobilization does not seem to
be key to explaining the length of the adoption process either, although Argentine emi-
grants have recently formulated demands for an expansion of voting methods as well as
for more transparency and timely information regarding elections.47
In Argentina, thus, the extension of suﬀrage to emigrants was carried out swiftly
during a period of democratization (conﬁrming H1). Although external voting was
introduced by an ordinary legislative change, the time lag was minimal due to a
broad legislative consensus around it (supporting H2).
Bolivia: a process of twofold adoption
Bolivia allows non-residents to participate in presidential elections as well as in national
referenda, but not in legislative elections. Bolivians abroad can vote in the polling
stations designated by the electoral authority. In the ﬁrst elections in which Bolivians
abroad were able to vote (2009), polling stations were opened in only four countries.
In the 2014 elections, this number increased to 33. The registration in the electoral
roll is voluntary and is updated automatically.
The adoption of external franchise in Bolivia lagged over a long period (Figure 2): exter-
nal voting was enacted in 1991, but only applied in 2009. To understand why Bolivian emi-
grants had to wait almost 20 years to exercise their right to vote in homeland elections, we
need to distinguish between two consecutive adoption processes of external enfranchise-
ment. The ﬁrst started with the enactment of a new Electoral Law under the presidency
of Jaime Paz Zamora in 1991 and lasted until 2006, when Evo Morales became president
and his political movement won the majority of the seats in the Bolivian Lower House.
The electoral law passed in 1991 established that non-resident citizens could partici-
pate in presidential elections and mandated the legislature to regulate the speciﬁcities of
external voting. Over time, this electoral code was amended on two occasions (1996 and
1999) and, although provisions about external voting were kept, external voting was
Figure 2. Bolivia’s external voting adoption process.
Note: Own elaboration. Left axis represents remittances (World Bank, Personal Remittances received as a percentage of GDP).
Right axis represents Polity IV indicator.
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neither regulated nor applied. This ﬁrst adoption process bore no concrete outcome.
During this period, the Bolivian party system was characterized by a moderate fragmen-
tation, a moderate number of eﬀective parties, low polarization and a centripetal com-
petition across political forces.48 Despite collaboration across the three main political
forces (materialized in the form of government and parliamentary coalitions) and the
intervention of the judiciary,49 it was impossible to reach a consensus regarding the
regulation of external voting (lending support to our Hypothesis 2a).
The second process of external enfranchisement in Bolivia (and the one that has cap-
tured the most scholarly attention) started with a signiﬁcant shift in the distribution of
power following the 2005 elections and leading to a new constitution approved in 2009.
Since 2005 the Bolivian political party system has been characterized by a minimum
number of eﬀective parties and a low fragmentation. Furthermore, external voting
became a political priority for the government of Evo Morales.50 In 2008 Morales tried
to pass a law to regulate it, but this attempt was stopped in the Bolivian Senate, where
Morales’s party did not hold a majority.51 Despite the signiﬁcant political and social
pressure exercised by Morales and a mobilized diaspora (mostly in Argentina), it was
not until 2009 (after the approval of the new constitution) that an agreement between gov-
ernment and opposition on external voting was reached. Interestingly, it was between 2007
and 2009 that the remittances sent over by emigrants reached their peak, equivalent to
more than 6% of the GDP.52,53 The regulation of external franchise was included in a tran-
sitional electoral law (Law N° 4021) that was meant to regulate the general elections of
2009. This law signiﬁcantly restricted the participation from abroad, limiting the registry
of emigrants to a maximum of 6%54 of the total Bolivian population.
The Bolivian two-fold adoption process oﬀers interesting evidence regarding our
hypotheses. On the one hand, since the enactment of external voting in Bolivia took
place in a context of stable democracy, we expected to observe a signiﬁcant lag. This
was indeed observed in the ﬁrst adoption process (supporting H1); but not in the
second. Probably because, during the second process of adoption, Bolivia was also
embarked in a process of profound political change (supporting H1). On the other
hand, the ﬁrst adoption process, initiated with an ordinary law, did not concluded due
to the lack of political consensus (supporting H2c); but the second process, started with
a new constitution, was completed successfully without a lag (contradicting, thus, H2b).
Mexico: a long lag induced by political contestation
Mexicans abroad can vote for presidential and legislative elections, per post, registering
actively for each election. After several reforms this keeps being an overly complicated
process which meant, for the recent July 2018, that only about 100,000 Mexican emi-
grants out of an estimated eligible diaspora of 4–5 million voted from abroad.
It took more than a decade for Mexican emigrants to get the vote (Figure 3) in a
process of ordinary legislation. External franchise was ﬁrst enacted in a package of elec-
toral reforms in 1996,55 widely recognized as pivotal to a slow process of democratiza-
tion that had started two decades earlier.56 Yet, the regulation needed for
implementation was passed only in 2006, after seven failed attempts across three legis-
latures. Despite a low number of parties and low fragmentation in the legislature
throughout the period, building a political consensus in this period was diﬃcult
under a regime of increasing competition and seems central to explain why the regu-
lation required took so long to materialize.
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Though Mexico has become a major transit and return country today, back in 1996,
when external voting was enacted, its migration proﬁle was primarily deﬁned by emi-
gration of persons of primarily a lower-skill level, who made Mexico the world’s top
receiver of remittances.57 In such context, debates around the symbolic importance
of emigrants and their contributions to their families’ social well-being at home held
sway. Still, in contrast to other countries in Central America and the Caribbean, the
relative weight of remittances in the Mexican economy has only ever reached a level
equivalent to 3% of the GDP at its peak, making it implausible to say that its
economy depends on these cash inﬂows (World Bank 2016). More signiﬁcantly,
besides a well-organized and sizeable diaspora (at roughly 10 million in the late
1990s), the Mexican state had created multi-level bureaucratic bodies to establish
links with and develop policies for its diaspora, the most important of which was the
IME (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior).
Precisely for its importance as a prominent and pioneer case of emigrant policies, the
Mexican external enfranchisement has been studied by many experts. Payán and
Schober58 considered 10 diﬀerent variables to explain why the regulation only suc-
ceeded on the eighth attempt. Since the trajectory of those attempts extends from
1996 to 2006, a more detailed explanation is needed to trace the factors that intervened
until it was ﬁnally approved in the 59th legislature. An obvious one is the composition
of the legislatures (57th–59th); although it was very diﬀerent each time, after 1997 no
party had an absolute majority in it, and the party that supported external voting
most consistently (but not the only one to propose it) was only the 3rd force
through this period (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD). Overall, the constel-
lation of actors in favour and against in the period was mixed. It is clear that the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was generally against external voting. The PRI had
held power when emigrant enfranchisement was enacted and until 2000, when peaceful
alternation in the oﬃce of the president took place after 71 years of PRI-rule, and
expected that emigrants would favour the opposition –which has turned out to be
true.59 It is less clear why the independent electoral authority Instituto Federal Electoral
(IFE) resisted. IFE’s centrality in assuring transparent and reliable elections has been
highlighted by observers of the Mexican transition to democracy,60 and some have
hypothesized it was politically motivated to oppose external voting. However, in a
Figure 3. Mexico’s external voting adoption process.
Note: Own elaboration. Left axis represents remittances (World Bank, Personal Remittances received as a percentage of GDP).
Right axis represents Polity IV indicator.
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context of slowly expanding pluralism, the IFE served as the only guarantor of free and
reliable elections and its suspicions regarding their impossibility to ensure that votes
from abroad could meet the same requirements as votes cast in Mexico must not
necessarily be read as meant to block emigrant participation. Rather, they echoed
doubts held also even within the parties proposing it. On the other side migrant associ-
ations pressed politicians to legislate on this matter since the early 1990s, as Calderón
Chelius’ (2010), Ayón’s61 and Laﬂeur’s62 accounts all highlight. Their pressure was
potentiated by the executive: the ﬁrst president after alternation, Vicente Fox, promised
emigrants to oversee that voting from abroad would come true.
In their account, Payán and Schober not only consider each attempt as discrete event
comparable to each other, but – inspiringly- observe that over time pressure builds,
until timing can become a deﬁnitive factor to push parties out of gridlock. In 2004
Fox instigated consultations between the three main political parties, the electoral auth-
ority and IME. These consultations were led by the Ministry of Home Aﬀairs, as IME
rose as emigrants’ spokesperson to keep close track of each deputy’s position. Still after
these consutlations two other law initiatives would fail. In the end, it was timing that did
it: a generous proposal of external vote regulation was hurriedly approved by 391 votes
in favour, 22 abstentions and 5 votes against, with the conﬁdence that the Senate would
revise it.63 Facing political pressure from the PRI, public concerns raised by IFE and the
newly founded Electoral Court64 the Senate then severely restricted the scope of the
franchise, allowing only postal voting under strict authentication conditions. The reg-
ulating law passed with 91 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention, and promulgated
in June 2005 after returning to the Deputies Chamber to gather ﬁnal 455 votes in favour,
6 against and 6 abstentions.65
Thus, Mexico shows supporting evidence for H1 and H2c in the sense that the course
of ordinary legislation tends to take the longest (H2c) especially when embedded in a
stepwise democratization process (H1) that lacks re-foundational stages such as new
constitutions and where a stable political majority in the legislative is lacking.
Paraguay: adoption by referendum
Since 2011, Paraguayan nationals abroad are allowed to participate in presidential elec-
tions, as well as in the elections for the Senate and the MERCOSUR parliament.
Although registration to vote is automatic, Paraguayan emigrants can only vote from
the consulates of three countries (Argentina, Spain and United States).
Paraguay is a case in which external voting was introduced after a referendum, with
no lag between enactment and the ﬁrst application (Paraguay enacted external voting in
2011 and applied it for the ﬁrst time in 2013). In June 2010, the Constitutional Aﬀairs
committee of the Paraguayan lower house introduced a proposal to amend the consti-
tution in order to grant non-resident citizens the right to vote in homeland elections
(Figure 4). In order for a constitutional amendment to pass, ﬁrst it had to be approved
by the majority of the two Paraguayan legislative houses and additionally be ratiﬁed in a
referendum. In April 2011, the Paraguayan Senate voted unanimously in favour of the
amendment and mandated the electoral authority (Tribunal Superior de Justicia Elec-
toral, TSJE) to call for a referendum within six months.
The referendum was ﬁnally organized in October 2011. External voting was favoured
by 77.4% of the votes and a turnout of 12.5% of the electoral roll. The regulation of non-
resident voting swiftly materialized. During 2013, the electoral authority issued the
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regulations needed to implement external voting (Regulation 32/2013 and Regulation
55/2013) and in April 2013, Paraguayans abroad were able to vote for the ﬁrst time
in homeland elections. The 2008–2013 legislature in Paraguay was characterized by a
low fragmentation and a low eﬀective number of parties,66 which helps to understand
why consensus was possible. Paraguay dependence on remittances in that period was
low and it did not play a role in the process of adoption.
The Paraguayan shows evidence that contradicts H1: despite the adoption of external
voting was conducted in the context of a stable democracy, the process was rather agile.
The evidence gathered indicates that this was probably because, in line with H2a, exter-
nal voting was enacted by a conﬁrmatory referendum.
Peru: early adoption with ample political consensus
Peru was one of the ﬁrst countries in Latin America that enfranchised its non-resident
citizens by means of a new constitution and in which there is no lag in the adoption
process. External voting was enacted with the Constitution of 1979 and applied in
May of 1980, the ﬁrst election thereafter (Figure 5). Currently, Peruvians abroad can
vote in national referenda and national elections (presidential and legislative). Regis-
tration for the franchise is automatic and, to cast the ballot, non-resident Peruvians
must go in person to their embassies or consulates.
It is important to consider the legal and political context of democratization in which
external voting was approved: it was incorporated by a Constitutional Assembly elected
in 1978 whose main mandate was to write the new democratic Constitution. The
Assembly was voted in June of 1978 and, although none of the parties gained an absol-
ute majority of the seats, it was not signiﬁcantly fragmented (that is, the eﬀective
number of parties was 4.4 and the fragmentation index 0.8).
External voting was introduced in Peru through the article of the constitution that
regulated suﬀrage (art. 65). This article established that all Peruvians citizens over 18
had the right to vote, without further speciﬁcations. The debates that took place in
the Constitutional Assembly about suﬀrage reveal that there was a wide consensus
among representatives about the normative imperative of incorporating all Peruvians,
Figure 4. Paraguay’s external voting adoption process.
Note: Own elaboration. Left axis represents remittances (World Bank, Personal Remittances received as a percentage of GDP).
Right axis represents Polity IV indicator.
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including non-residents, into the political process, and especially into the elections. The
only issues that raised questions among representatives were related to the regulation of
external voting that was meant to be carried out by the electoral administration (Jurado
Nacional de Elecciones). Speciﬁcally, issues such as voting methods from abroad (in
order to avoid fraud), the type of elections in which non-resident Peruvians would par-
ticipate as well as the mode of representation or the question of mandatory voting were
brought up during the Constitutional deliberations. In addition, some representatives
(for example, Cáceres Velázquez) raised concerns about the plausibility of implement-
ing external voting in the elections of 1980 due to the tight time frame between the
enactment and its implementation. The Constitutional Assembly decided, nevertheless,
to reserve any statement on the speciﬁc regulation of external voting, agreeing that was
among the competences of the electoral authority (making this, indeed, explicit in a
transitional provision). Days after the enactment of the constitution (and, thus, external
voting), the President of the Republic, Morales Bermúdez, called the elections that
would be held in May 1980 (Decree No. 22622). The elections were regulated by the
Electoral Statute of 1962 (Decree-Law No 1420) with the modiﬁcations included in
the transitional provisions of the 1979 Constitution and the speciﬁc regulation
decreed by the government and the electoral authority. The electoral authority dictated
the regulations for external voting with an administrative order published in December
1979. With this order they managed to regulate everything required to hold the elec-
tions outside the Peruvian territorial boundaries (for example, registration, voting
methods, mode of representation).
It is worth pointing out that during the military regime (1968–1980), Peruvian emi-
gration was not as signiﬁcant as in the following decades (Banco Mundial 2017).67 In
this sense, it seems that the emigrant community or their remittances did not play a
crucial role in external voting adoption process. In fact, during the constitutional delib-
erations none of these issues were spoken about.
The evidence oﬀered by the Peruvian case shows that the adoption of external voting
was more conditioned by the context of democratization (in line with H1), than by the
legal mechanism of adoption since Peru introduced external voting with the enactment
of a new constitution and it managed to complete the external adoption process in only
one year (therefore, contradicting H2b).
Figure 5. Peru’s external voting adoption process.
Note: Own elaboration. Right axes represents Polity IV indicator. No information about remittances for period of analysis.
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Case comparison conclusions
Having explored two hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of the democratization scenario
and the mechanism of enactment on the enfranchisement process of non-residents,
we conclude, ﬁrst of all, that to understand how enfranchisements occur it does not
suﬃce to rely on indicators of democratization indices, but it is necessary to look at
the dynamics of political contestation as a regime opens. Second, we found that the pol-
icymaking routes used to extend the franchise are a good indicator of these dynamics.
Third, our analysis also reveals an interesting ﬁnding: under the mechanism of ordinary
law-making, as shown by the Argentinian case, a low level of contestation around exter-
nal voting enhances an expedite process. On the contrary, a high level of contestation
hinders the adoption process, especially if the conﬁgurations in the legislatures change
after enactment. This is clearly observed in the Mexican and the Bolivian cases (in its
ﬁrst intent of adoption). Finally, a tangential factor that emerged as relevant is the
support from the presidential oﬃce, which we did not propose as a hypothesis –
since we had no variation of political systems (that is, parliamentary) to explore in
the region-, but which we would propose for further studies to consider (Table 5).
General conclusions
While the adoption of external voting, like other types of enfranchisement, has been
often conceptualized as a one-time event, here we proposed that it is best thought of
as a process with duration and sequence. To understand why many enfranchisement
reforms get stuck in shallow, non-applicable reforms, we think it is relevant to under-
stand their constitutive parts. We analysed emigrant enfranchisement, a late, very
widely adopted form of enfranchisement across democracies; as a dynamic process
that comprises three stages: enactment, regulation, and application. To develop our
theoretical propositions into exploratory hypotheses, we ﬁrst mapped the adoption
process of external voting in 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries and
showed that a noteworthy lag exists between enactment and application in over half
of the countries that gave emigrants the right to vote. Our ﬁndings from that exercise
revealed intriguing patterns: we found that the weighty lags occur between enactment
and regulation; not between regulation and ﬁrst implementation. This ﬁnding is impor-
tant for a larger literature beyond emigrant voting: a careful understanding of the key
components of enfranchisement processes can help us understand why they vary. While
it is clear that the dynamics of political contestation are decisive in leading some pro-
cesses seamlessly to completion or blocking them, it is only by diﬀerentiating its
sequence and stages that are we able to say where in the process such contestation
seems to be decisive. Following classics of comparative political institutions, we devel-
oped hypotheses on the eﬀect of the policy-making route on the process expediency,
considering that diﬀerent legal mechanisms of enactment provide variable opportu-
nities for contestation, making processes more or less vulnerable to delays. Our
Table 5. Adoption of external voting: summary of ﬁndings.
Hypothesis Argentina Bolivia Mexico Peru Paraguay
Democratization (H1) Supports Supports Supports Supports Contradicts
Mechanism (H2) Supports Mixeda Supports Contradicts Supports
Note: aDue to within-case variation. Source: Own elaboration.
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ﬁndings suggest that these explorative hypotheses are plausible, but their validation will
require further testing. Thus, we encourage qualitative and quantitative researchers in
the larger literature on enfranchisement to keep exploring this issue. On the one hand,
qualitative researchers can strive to introduce dynamism into their treatment of
enfranchisement (that is, upgrade them from events to processes) by diﬀerentiating
its stages; with sensitivity to process as they follow how political actors negotiate,
frame and battle for or against enfranchisement. On the other hand, quantitative
research can strive to systematically observe the stages and policy-making paths to
make their analyses more comparable.
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